### 1NC---World Systems

#### Neolib isn’t a monolithic root cause but pervasive---micropolitics disseminates post-Fordist productivity into remote terrains of lived experience to corrupt dissent.

Papadopoulos 8 (Dimitris, School of Social Science @Cardiff U, Leicester Reader in Sociology and Organisation. “In the ruins of representation: Identity, individuality, subjectification”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 47.1, ebsco//shree)

The turn to micropolitics and the dissolution of the foundationalist understandings of identity (either in its essentialist or discursive reductionist versions) enable political analyses of previously neglected and effaced domains of everyday life. But do micropolitics effectively challenge state regulation and open pathways for the emergence of a multiplicity of different modes of embodied subjectification? Or does embodied subjectification become a new mode of state regulated existence? The power of micropolitics is thought to lie in the fact that they bypass the reproduction of the state as an intact and paramount entity of power. Micropolitics harness everyday lived and embodied experience as a vital matter of political struggles which aim to reinvigorate civil society, that is, the struggles of associations of people which develop outside of state institutions (Warner, 2002). However, seen historically, since the 1980s micropolitics have increasingly become integral to the effective realization of neoliberal governance. This is because this mode of engagement is aligned with transformations which have occurred at the level of the state. The neoliberal state is not a monolithic container, rather it disseminates into the most remote terrains of everyday experience. The dismantling of welfare systems has accelerated, and finally consolidated, the state’s withdrawal from the traditional role of centralized organizer of society. However, the result has not been the disappearance of the state itself, rather we are witnessing the disappearance of the welfare state and the emergence of new one (Fairbrother & Rainnie, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Social control is primarily performed through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individual existence: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your living-room. In this process, embodied subjectification and micropolitics have become necessary elements for the functioning of the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state needs, more than self-regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation (Marazzi, 1998; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). Hence, although they arose as an attempt to challenge the overly narrow focus on the state, micropolitics have played a vital role in shifting the historical function of the state from centralized control into a disseminated form of control which operates effectively in the terrain of social and cultural life. In this sense, both state- and micropolitics articulate their political agenda inside the terrain of the state and affirm its function and centrality in social life. This is the moment where embodied subjectification and the broader project of critical psychology amplify the production of affirmative subjectivity, a subjectivity which paradoxically solidifies state regulation by operating at its margins. However, the generation of affirmative subjectivity is more than a form of political regulation in contemporary North-Atlantic societies. It is also a productive force in the literal sense. The traditional apparatus for measuring and diagnosing individual differences was insufficient as a response to the social and economical transformations related to post-Fordist labour (Bowring, 2002; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2002; Moulier Boutang, 2003; Williams, 1994). This is because post-Fordism appropriates as productive resources precisely these forms of individual action and experience, which refer to the totality of individual subjectivity: relationality, emotions, memory, communication, creativity and primarily, the totality of the body. Critical psychology’s conceptualization captures the core tenet of the post-Fordist transformation in a magnificent way: embodied subjectification becomes the algorithm for the realization of the process of the ‘subjectivization of work’, a process which lies in the heart of post-Fordist productivity (Lohr & Nickel, 2005; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; Scho¨nberger & Springer, 2003). Yet critical psychology neither traces possible ruptures in the post-Fordist arrangement nor explores everyday forms of exodus and disobedience (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Virno, 2004). In other words, the critical psychological view of subjectification can elucidate, or diagnose, the productive role of the psychology in the social earthquake which accompanied the post-Fordist reorganization of labour and everyday sociality in North-Atlantic societies (Gordo-Lo´pez & Pujol Tarre´s, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2004). However, critical psychology is unable to engage with the suppressed potentialities of post-Fordist social relations which could lead to forms of political engagement that question post-Fordism itself (Karakayali & Tsianos, 2005; Negri, 1999; Santos, 2001; Stephenson, 2004). The reason for this is, as I argued above, that embodied subjectification is the core productive form of today’s sociality. Embodied subjectification is not only a heuristic tool which enables social researchers to understand power relations in post-Fordist North-Atlantic societies, but also the very guarantor of what Weber (1978) calls ‘legitimate domination’. A form of domination which is actively and willingly performed differently by each individual and congeals a form of power, which, following Hannah Arendt (1970), emerges not as a means to dominate but by the very fact that people act together. Embodied subjectification (and its very theoreticization by governmentality studies) is a form of obedience to today’s configuration of power in North-Atlantic societies. In this sense, micropolitics and embodied subjectification constitute a form of affirmative subjectivity in neoliberal and post-Fordist conditions. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly discuss Jacques Rancie`re’s concept of politics as a means for interfering in the production of affirmative subjectivity (for a more broad discussion of this issue s. Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

**Transhistorical theories of anti-blackness naturalize violence and provide no basis for political organizing – only economic solidarity can check far-right fascism.**

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Antiracist reactions to Bernie Sanders’s challenge and its invigoration of a redistributionist left illustrate the extent to which this race politics is at bottom a class politics. Dismissal of Sanders’s agenda and assertions that Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, living wage, and national health care, for example, somehow were not black issues underscores that this turn in black politics is **committed** to an agenda restricted to combating racial disparities **within prevailing structures of inequality**. Thus, in its purview economic redistribution seems racially inauthentic, but the annual controversies over group parity in awards of Oscars, Grammies, and other accolades appear as burning social justice issues. Only ideological blinders can block out the implication that a fair share of acclaim for Ava DuVernay, Nate Parker or Rihanna is, or should be, more important to black Americans than general access to decent, secure employment and retirement, health care and a vibrant public sector.

Contemporary antiracist politics hinges on the **premise** that race, or racism, continues to determine the political, social, and economic circumstances of black people much as it did at the turn of the twentieth century or even earlier, **under slavery**. That premise underlies and drives assertions that, for example, mass incarceration is “the new Jim Crow” or a latter-day slavery. DuVernay’s documentary, 13th, all but argues explicitly that the Thirteenth Amendment’s clause exempting “punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” from its blanket prohibition of involuntary servitude was intended to leave space for reintroducing slavery, now through mass incarceration. (To those who may object that DuVernay’s documentary does not openly make such a claim, I submit reports from several colleagues at universities in different parts of the country, including my own experience at Penn, of undergraduate students who have advanced it explicitly.) Ta-Nehisi Coates hammers incessantly on the note that racism or white supremacy is a **transhistorical**, unchanging, and **ontological force** which white people generically are either committed to, driven by, or both and that that force – an urge to engage in “the plunder of black bodies” – is the singular explanation of disadvantage, inequality, or injustice experienced by black Americans.

It is instructive that Coates and others who argue that racism remains the most potent force generating racially invidious inequalities commonly invoke **superficial analogies** with **earlier historical moments** when racial classification much more directly limited black people’s life chances. They do not attempt to explain how racism produces those outcomes in the present; the **analogy stands in lieu of explanation**. Michelle **Alexander** even acknowledges in the book that popularized the “new Jim Crow” analogy in relation to mass incarceration that, when all is said and done, it is **not an accurate description** of current conditions. The objective of antiracist politics is **less to explain**, and thereby **inform strategies for addressing**, the dynamics that generate and reproduce inequalities than to **assert** a claim that “racism” is the label that should attach to any and all injustices affecting black people. So, notwithstanding their dismissals of calls for grounding leftist strategy on challenging broad economic inequality as “class reductionist,” advocates of contemporary antiracism in fact embrace a **race reductionism**.

There is a **logical contradiction** at the core of this form of antiracist argument. Analogies to earlier historical moments when racial classification directly constrained black people’s life chances are **so central** to the **reductionist arguments** that ground antiracist politics because racism is now negatively sanctioned in contemporary American culture. It is conventional wisdom today that racism was the principal cause, or at least principal justification, of black inequality during slavery and southern Jim Crow segregation; slavery and imposed racial hierarchy are repugnant to contemporary sensibilities. That means, however, that denunciation of current practices or relations through **analogies** to those earlier regimes of injustice seems **powerful rhetorically** precisely because of a **presumption that the claim is not true**. For the claim to have the desired force, those making it must assume that things have changed because the charge is fundamentally a denunciation of objectionable conditions or incidents as atavistic and a call for others to regard them as such.

As Yale Law Professor James Forman, Jr. has argued, regarding the **trope** that mass incarceration is a new Jim Crow, such analogies both **diminish** the importance of the **victories** of the last half-century and **trivialize** the dangers and constraints – the concrete manifestations of explicitly racial oppression – that defined the earlier periods. The most **superficial knowledge** of the past and observation of the present should establish that black Americans **do not** live under the same restricted and perilous conditions now as in 1865, or for that matter 1965. The contention that racism singularly defines black reality is therefore **not an empirical claim**, even though many advancing it seem earnestly convinced that it is. It is a lament that racism persists as a force impeding black Americans’ aspirations, that no matter how successful or financially secure individual black people may be, they remain similarly subject to victimization by it. The claim carries a tacit preface: “(this incident/phenomenon/pattern makes it seem as though) nothing has changed.” In practical terms, it is an assertion that race/racism should remain the default frame of reference for discussing any and all inequalities bearing on black Americans.

Persistence of racialized patterns of inequality and expressions of open bigotry give this reductionist perspective a **ring of truth**, and struggle against specifically racial injustice has always been a central component of black Americans’ political activity. In addition, for at least a quarter-century political elites, the commentariat, and academics have propagated a notion that black politics consists in drawing attention to specifically racial injustices, chiefly identifying disparities. Even black concerns with issues that affect the population across the board, e.g. **climate change**, nonetheless seem to require assertion of a particularly racial impact. The “blacks have it worse” **trope** is at this point, like an ejaculation in the Catholic liturgy, a **predictable reflex** in political argument centered on disparity as the lone truly actionable injustice. **Rhetorically**, that claim is not a call to popular political action but a demand for recognition based on moral priority.

Like any ideology that gains traction, race reductionism also has a **material foundation**. Black ethnic politics consolidated around exponential growth of a stratum of office holders and public functionaries, and it has encouraged and reinforced development of what might be called a political economy of race-relations or diversity management. That includes a burgeoning, multibillion dollar diversity industry that extends to corporations and universities, where pursuit and monitoring of diversity is woven into human resource functions and overseen by in-house diversity professionals and administrators and freelance consultants. Insofar as diversity is valued in personnel policies, the significance of this political economy, and the ideology that emanates from and underwrites it, ranges far beyond those who work in the diversity/race relations economy directly. Diversity as a norm of fairness pervades the professional-managerial strata and ratifies an ideal of social justice that **harmonizes seamlessly with market-driven neoliberalism** because it combines celebration of difference and aggressive pursuit of equality of opportunity, to the **exclusion of economic redistribution**. This is the essential truth reflected in the subtitle of Walter Benn Michaels’s book, The Trouble with Diversity, namely that we – at least in the professional-managerial strata – have come to “love identity and ignore inequality.”

The political economy of race relations management has grown symbiotically with neoliberalism. The symbiosis may be clearest in the privatization, outsourcing, and overall retraction of social services, as claims to authentic representation of “community” voices and perspectives factor into criteria for awarding contracts and standing in policy processes that are increasingly insulated from democratic oversight and accountability. The norm of representation as embodiment of appropriate categories of identity gives private and nonprofit contractors an easy standard of legitimacy that collapses possible differences on policy issues and directions into vacant liberal proceduralism (having a “seat at the table”) and Victorian racialist mysticism (“reflecting the perspective of the X”). The symbiotic relationship shows up also in the ways that a politics grounded on identity can **obfuscate** dynamics of economic inequality and dispossession by rendering them in cultural terms.

Debate over displacement for upscaling redevelopment is a case in point. In opting for a language of “gentrification,” opponents of displacement, often without intending to do so, cloud a simple, straightforward dynamic – public support of private developers’ pursuit of rent-intensifying redevelopment – with cultural implications that shift critique away from the issue of using public authority to engineer upward redistribution and impose hardship on relatively vulnerable residents. Instead, discussion of gentrification slides into objections about display of privilege, and lack of recognition or respect that, notwithstanding the moral outrage that accompanies them, accept the logic of rent-intensifying redevelopment as given and demand that newcomers acknowledge and honor aboriginal habitus and practices and that the “community” be involved in the processes of upgrading. A similar racial or cultural discourse has unhelpfully shaped opposition to charterization of public education by focusing on the racial dimension of the process. The fundamental problem with Teach For America and such privatizers, after all, is not that the missionaries are mainly white and unfamiliar with native culture or even that many of them are tourists building extracurriculars for their graduate and professional school dossiers. Those are only idiosyncratically distasteful features of a particular line of attack on one front in a broader war on public goods and the idea of social solidarity in line with marketization of all human needs.

And that sort of culturalist discourse also opens opportunities for **petty**, and not so petty, entrepreneurship in the name of respect or recognition of the community, **within the logic of neoliberalization**. Race reductionism enables a **sleight-of-hand** in which benefits to individuals can appear to be victories for the generic racial population or community. The more deeply embedded a groupist notion of fairness or justice becomes as common sense, the more easily that sleight-of-hand works under labels like “community empowerment,” “voice,” “opportunity,” or “representation” to propel and legitimize accumulation by dispossession.

The symbiotic relation between antiracist politics and Democratic neoliberalism helps to make sense of the vitriol with which so many antiracist activists have reacted to Sanders and the renewed interest in challenging economic inequality. Notwithstanding copious evocations of the heroic period of black insurgent activism, this politics is not directed toward generating the deep and broad solidarities necessary for building an insurgent political movement. It is an insider, elite-driven interest group politics that is concerned less with reducing inequality than with establishing and maintaining what Kenneth Warren describes as “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” As West observed regarding the race relations framework’s emergence at the dawn of the twentieth century, claims to speak for black concerns in this politics do not depend on demonstration of accountability to any specific constituencies of black people. From Coates and other pundits to the many random Black Lives Matter activists those who expatiate about black Americans’ lack of interest in social-democratic politics claim interpretive authority based on the **mysticism** of organic racial representation and, most immediately, recognition by corporate media and elites as authentic voices.

That is a crucial context within which we should understand antiracists’ tendency to align with Wall Street Democrats in denouncing calls for general redistribution and their insistence that Trump’s victory most meaningfully expresses the depth of commitments to white supremacy, sexism, and homophobia particularly among “white working class” voters. The contention that working-class disaffection from Clintonite neoliberalism most of all expresses backlash against blacks and others is an argument, as Clinton’s snide dismissal of Sanders indicates, that economic inequality is not a central concern for blacks, women, immigrants, LGBT or transgender people. A year into the Trump presidency and unimpeded Republican control of Congress and of most state governments has confirmed what many on the left have known all along, that the right’s agenda is an **all-out attack** on working people, **no matter** what their racial and gender classifications and identities or sexual orientations. The alliance of Democratic neoliberalism and an identity-based notion of social justice has contributed to this nightmarish outcome precisely by diminishing the significance of a policy orientation that abets upward redistribution and intensifying economic inequality and racializing the working class as white losers. Doubling down on that approach, as Clintonites and race- and gender-reductionists exhort, **will not effectively counter the right’s strategy**. The real lesson of 2016 is that we need both to **mobilize** for 2018 and 2020 on a basis that focuses on the concerns and anxieties that working people **share** across those categories of identity and to **organize** for the **longer term** to cultivate those **solidarities** as part of building a movement that can **change the terms of debate** to pivot on **how government can best provide** for the security and **welfare** of the vast majority of the population who must work for a living. This means, among other things, that we must be confident in **rejecting claims** – no matter how **flamboyantly adorned** they are with **moral posturing** and **evocations of past insurgencies** – that black Americans or other nonwhites, immigrants, women, LGBTQ and transgender people somehow will spurn access to quality affordable housing, health care, education, secure employment with decent wages, benefits and rights and protections on the job , and high-quality public goods and services as not pertinent to them.

#### Neolib commoditizes life, ensures inequality and eco-crisis

Harvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171//shree)

To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity. Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guide––an ethic––for all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a curious penchant to pursue ‘corruption’ as if it is easily distinguishable from the normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example).¶ Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contract––marriage, for example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame ‘liberals’, ‘Hollywood’, or even ‘postmodernists’ for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term commitments in their endless pursuit of profit.¶ But there are far more serious issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, ‘are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious’. While capitalism cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:¶ To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of man’s labour power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.18¶ The damage wrought through the ‘floods and droughts’ of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyi’s final point. But his theses on labour and land deserve further elaboration.¶ Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as ‘human cap- ital’) and tastes (sometime referred to as ‘cultural capital’), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers’ advantage. Conversely, workers may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely construct- ing that ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ of which Polanyi speaks.¶ Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A ‘personal responsibility system’ (how apt Deng’s language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets.¶ The second prong of attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too much can be made of the ‘race to the bottom’ to find the cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they are exposed.¶ Under neoliberalization, the figure of ‘the disposable worker’ emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: ‘unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all’.20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows:¶ We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes––especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered––until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21¶ Similar tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse ‘in which 61 workers, locked in the building, died in a fire’ received a ‘lenient’ two-year suspended sentence because he had ‘showed repentance’ and ‘cooperated in the aftermath of the fire’.22¶ Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of women’s liberation from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved). The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of women’s rights through neoliberalization has been nothing short of catastrophic.¶ So how, then, do disposable workers––women in particular–– survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. ‘I shop therefore I am’ and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the world’s disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people condemned to live on less than $2 a day, the taunting world of capitalist consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the self-congratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization, privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the financial burdens of the poor.24

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

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Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

### 1NC---Topicality

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government

The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Prohibitions are laws

Collins Dictionary. "Prohibition definition and meaning". Accessed: 9-13-2021. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/prohibition

Definition of 'prohibition'

prohibition

(proʊɪbɪʃən)

Word forms: plural prohibitions

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

...a prohibition on discrimination. [+ on]

...prohibitions against feeding birds at the airport. [+ against]

2. See also prohibit

#### The core antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that increases prohibitions on private sector business practices by expanding the scope of the core antitrust laws

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Fairness – the Neg should win on average 50 percent of the time – any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose – their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Rigorous testing – debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third and fourth line responses – that’s key to politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs – their interp explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

## Case

#### Vote negative on presumption---their embarking on a trek away from Man does nothing to change dominant discourses or structures that perpetuate anti-blackness. Their challenge to anti-black violence has no means of spilling outside of debate, which is necessary for them to solve any of their impacts---BUT their belief that it does is cruel optimism, which turns case.

#### Neurological, racial bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain---orienting groups around institutional change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions.

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. **Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending**. It would be easy **to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and** even, perhaps, **an** inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. **Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress**. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. **Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias**. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. **There is little question that** categories such as **race**, gender, and age **play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others**. However, **research has shown that how people categorize** themselves **may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others**. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These **findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions**. Recent research confirms **that** coalition**-based** preferences trump race**-based** preferences. For example, **both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political** party **much** more than **they favor those who share** their race. These **coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics**. Our **research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a** mixed-race team **can** diminish **their** automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, **White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias**. **Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race**. **Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the** amygdala responded **to** team **membership** rather than race. Taken together, **these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves**. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) **Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa)**. Indeed, psychological and biological responses **to out-group members** can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not **all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those** stereotypes can be tempered **with** other info**rmation.** **If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances.** **The** flexible nature **of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be** cautiously optimistic **about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict** (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely **creating a sense of** cohesion **between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals**. **These** sorts of **strategies** can help **reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is** critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. **Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups**. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that **we**, as a society, **have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination**. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. **Ultimately, only** collective action **and** institutional evolution **can address systemic racism**. **The science is clear on one thing, though:** individual bias and discrimination are changeable**.** **Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are** created and reinforced by **many** social factors, **but they are** not inevitable consequences of **our** biology**.** Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### Weheliye’s thesis is inconsistent. *Habeas Viscus* lacks a vision for what ought to happen – if the law is inaccessible, there is no way to utilize Agamben’s state of exception for revolution. Metaphor is not action.

David Marriott 15. Professor of History, UC Santa Cruz. “Black Critical and Cultural Theory.” *Years Work Crit Cult Theory* 23(1): 190-206. Emory Libraries.

I suppose Habeas Viscus must be read very differently depending on whether it is approached as a contribution to the theory of bare life or as a contribution to the social death theory of blackness. Yet, as both it succeeds in showing why the reader of the one needs to become the reader of the other. If the biopolitical can never have done with the problem of black social death and the language of race; and any philosophical engagement with that problem and language finds itself implicated and at issue in how race informs the notion of exception, then it is important to know how bare life and biopolitics ‘misconstrues how profoundly race and racism shape the modern idea of the human’ (p. 4). If Weheliye’s underlying thematic encourages us to read that opening question as fundamental, if the eight chapters that compose the book—on blackness, bare life, assemblages, racism, law, depravation, deprivation and freedom—thus beckon towards a future focus for Black Studies in the light of that question, then it matters whether Weheliye offers a persuasive answer to this question. While the critique of bare life and politics is an important one, the need to rethink blackness as a refusal of the exception is not entirely convincing and thus the risk of incompleteness is not only methodological. At risk is the overall coherence of the book, and this risk is never quite resolved.

Moreover, how are we to take this reference to ‘flesh’ when it is made without reference to the alterations it has already wrought on feminist theories of black abjection, on, say, the sexual reproduction of chattel slavery? What is it that saves the flesh from suffering if not Spiller’s reference to a symbolic yay-saying to the law (of the mother) rather than the father’s name? Perhaps it is because black flesh in being so quickly removed from law, and placed in parenthetical abjection, is always the trace of violent dejection, that its freedom belongs in formulating itself in relation to law’s obliteration? Weheliye describes his notion of habeas viscus as more radical than Spillers insofar as it does not ‘obey the logic of legal possession’ but nonetheless also inhabits a language of future anteriority (that is, an ending or catastrophe that has already happened, but one that can also only be borne in a messianic now). Weheliye, like Scott, refers to Benjamin’s theory of messianic time in which time is restituted neither through ontology or ethics nor some amalgam of the two, but through revolutionary acts of the oppressed (p. 133).

Perhaps what Weheliye and Scott (and Benjamin) have in common is the thought that at a certain time and in a variety of ways, a future can be thought as a point of redemption or transformation or irrevocable encounter that can never be read, or written as such. Unlike Scott, Weheliye will not say that time and history are out of joint, for what revolution requires is ‘a real state of exception’ (!) which he describes as a ‘prehensive shift’ in time (p. 134). In one of its guises, habeas viscus will name and be the name of this real state in the very possibility of a non-racializing emergence of the human. But how can this shift be both ‘exterior to the jurisdiction of law’ and be a real state of exception if the exception is what calls into being both law and sovereignty? (p. 136) Habeas Viscus rarely goes beyond a language of metaphor and lyricism when describing this shift to future anterior freedoms and, in his readings of Benjamin (and other thinkers and texts), his theorizing quickly breaks down into a serial use of metaphors but one which singularly fails to open up ‘flesh’ as a space of thinking the beyond of sovereignty, capitalism, and of law. As such, Habeas Viscus represents, in my view, a somewhat tenuous, inconclusive attempt to think a future from the ‘enfleshed parenthetical present of the oppressed’ (p. 138).

#### Reform is possible and good. Strategic demands on the government can move the political center. Defeatist attitudes ensure the world stays the same.

Eddie S. Glaude 16. Professor of African American Studies and Religion, Princeton. *Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves*. Princeton University Press. 185-97.

CHANGE HOW WE VIEW GOVERNMENT

For more than three decades, we have been bludgeoned with an idea of government that has little to no concern for the public good. Big government is bad, we are told. It is inefficient, and its bloated bureaucracies are prone to corruption. Even Democrats, especially since Bill Clinton, have taken up this view. For example, Obama says, "We don't need big government; we need smart government."

For some on the right, big government is bad because it aims to distribute wealth to those who are lazy and undeserving. "Big government" is just a shorthand for dreaded entitlement programs-all too often coded language for race. In this view, "big government" is the primary agent of enforcing racial equality, taking hard-earned stuff from white Americans and giving it to undeserving others. Government cannot do such a thing, they argue, without infringing on the rights of white Americans. And even government-mandated redistribution will not solve the problem. As Barry Goldwater put the point in 1964, "No matter how we try, we cannot pass a law that will make you like me or me like you. The key to racial and religious tolerance lies not in laws alone but, ultimately, in the hearts of men." From this perspective, government plays no role in changing our racial habits. Why would we want to make it bigger?

But Goldwater failed to realize that governmental indifference can harden hearts, and government action can create conditions that soften them. People's attitudes aren't static or untouchable. They are molded by the quality of interactions with others, and one of the great powers of government involves shaping those interactions-not determining them in any concrete sense, but defining the parameters within which people come to know each other and live together. Today, for example, most Americans don't believe women should be confined to the home raising children, or subjected to crude advances and sexist remarks by men. The women's-rights movement put pressure on the government, which in turn passed laws that helped change some of our beliefs about women. Similarly, the relative progress of the 1960s did not happen merely by using the blunt instruments of the law. Change emerged from the ways those laws, with grassroots pressure, created new patterns of interactions, and ultimately new habits. Neither Obama's election to the presidency nor my appointment as a Princeton professor would have happened were it not for these new patterns and habits.

None of this happens overnight. It takes time and increasing vigilance to protect and secure change. I was talking with a dose friend and he mentioned a basic fact: that we were only fifteen years removed from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when Ronald Reagan was elected president and Republicans began to dismantle the gains of the black freedom struggle. Civil rights legislation and the policies of the Great Society had just started to reshape our interactions when they started to be rolled back. We barely had a chance to imagine America anew-to pursue what full employment might look like, to let the abolition of the death penalty settle in, to question seriously the morality of putting people in prison cells, and to enact policies that would undo what the 1968 Kerner Commission described as "two Americas"­ before the attack on "big government" or, more precisely, the attack on racial equality was launched. The objective was to shrink the size of government ("to starve the beast") and to limit its domestic responsibilities to ensuring economic efficiency and national defense. Democrats eventually buckled, and this is the view of government, no matter who is in office, that we have today. It has become a kind of touchstone of faith among most Americans that government is wasteful and should be limited in its role-that it shouldn't intrude on our lives. Politicians aren't the only ones who hold this view. Many Americans do, too. Now we can't even imagine serious talk of things like full employment or the abolition of prisons.

We have to change our view of government, especially when it comes to racial matters. Government policy ensured the vote for African Americans and dismantled legal segregation. Policy established a social safety net for the poor and elderly; it put in place the conditions for the growth of our cities. All of this didn't happen simply because of individual will or thanks to some abstract idea of America. It was tied up with our demands and expectations. Goldwater was wrong. So was Reagan. And, in many ways, so is Obama. Our racial habits are shaped by the kind of society in which we live, and our government plays a big role in shaping that society. As young children, our community offers us a way of seeing the world; it lets us know what is valuable and sacred, and what stands as virtuous behavior and what does not. When Michael Brown's body was left in the street for more than four hours, it sent a clear message about the value of black lives. When everything in our society says that we should be less concerned about black folk, that they are dangerous, that no specific policies can address their misery, we say to our children and to everyone else that these people are "less than"-that they fall outside of our moral concern. We say, without using the word, that they are niggers.

One way to change that view is to enact policies that suggest otherwise. Or, to put it another way, to change our view of government, we must change our demands of government. For example, for the past fifty years African American unemployment has been twice that of white unemployment. The 2013 unemployment rate for African Americans stood at 13.1 percent, the highest annual black unemployment rate in more than seventy years. Social scientists do not generally agree on the causes of this trend. Some attribute it to the fact that African Americans are typically the "last hired and first fired." Others point to changes in the nature of the economy; still others point to overt racial discrimination in the labor market. No matter how we account for the numbers, the fact remains that most Americans see double-digit black unemployment as "normal." However, a large-scale, comprehensive jobs agenda with a living wage designed to put Americans, and explicitly African Americans, to work would go a long way toward uprooting the racial habits that inform such a view. It would counter the nonsense that currently stands as a reason for long-term black unemployment in public debate: black folk are lazy and don't want to work.

If we hold the view that government plays a crucial role in ensuring the public good-if we believe that all Americans, no matter their race or class, can be vital contributors to our beloved community-then we reject the idea that some populations are disposable, that some people can languish in the shadows while the rest of us dance in the light. The question ''Am I my brother's or my sister's keeper?" is not just a question for the individual or a mantra to motivate the private sector. It is a question answered in the social arrangements that aim to secure the goods and values we most cherish as a community. In other words, we need an idea of government that reflects the value of all Americans, not just white Americans or a few people with a lot of money.

We need government seriously committed to racial justice. As a nation, we can never pat ourselves on the back about racial matters. We have too much blood on our hands. Remembering that fact-our inheritance, as Wendell Berry said-does not amount to beating ourselves over the head, or wallowing in guilt, or trading in race cards. Remembering our national sins serves as a check and balance against national hubris. We're reminded of what we are capable of, and our eyes are trained to see that ugliness when it rears its head. But when we disremember-when we forget about the horrors of lynching, lose sight of how African Americans were locked into a dual labor market because of explicit racism, or ignore how we exported our racism around the world-we free ourselves from any sense of accountability. Concern for others and a sense of responsibility for the whole no longer matter. Cruelty and indifference become our calling cards.

We have to isolate those areas in which long-standing trends of racial inequality short-circuit the life chances of African Americans. In addition to a jobs agenda, we need a comprehensive government response to the problems of public education and mass incarceration. And I do mean a government response. Private interests have overrun both areas, as privatization drives school reform (and the education of our children is lost in the boisterous battles between teachers' unions and private interests) and as big business makes enormous profits from the warehousing of black and brown people in prisons. Let's be clear: private interests or market-based strategies will not solve the problems we face as a country or bring about the kind of society we need. We have to push for massive government investment in early childhood education and in shifting the center of gravity of our society from punishment to restorative justice. We can begin to enact the latter reform by putting an end to the practice of jailing children. Full stop. We didn't jail children in the past. We don't need to now.

In sum, government can help us go a long way toward uprooting racial habits with policies that support jobs with a living wage, which would help wipe out the historic double-digit gap between white and black unemployment; take an expansive approach to early childhood education, which social science research consistently says profoundly affects the life chances of black children; and dismantle the prison-industrial complex. We can no longer believe that disproportionately locking up black men and women constitutes an answer to social ills.

This view of government cannot be dismissed as a naive pipe dream, because political considerations relentlessly attack our political imaginations and limit us to the status quo. We are told before we even open our mouths that this particular view won't work or that it will never see the light of day. We've heard enough of that around single payer health care reform and other progressive policies over the Obama years. Such defeatist attitudes conspire to limit our imaginations and make sure that the world stays as it is. But those of us who don't give a damn about the rules of the current political game must courageously organize, advocate, and insist on the moral and political significance of a more robust role for government. We have to change the terms of political debate.

Something dramatic has to happen. American democracy has to be remade. John Dewey, the American philosopher, understood this:

The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered and rediscovered, remade and reorganized; while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied have to be remade and reorganized to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for satisfying these needs.

Dewey saw American democracy as an unfinished project. He knew that the aims and purposes of this country were not fixed forever in the founding documents, but the particular challenges of our moment required imaginative leaps on behalf of democracy itself. Otherwise, undemocratic forces might prevail; tyranny in the form of the almighty dollar and the relentless pursuit of it might overtake any commitment to the idea of the public good; and bad habits might diminish our moral imaginations.

The remaking of America will not happen inside the Beltway. Too many there have too much invested in the status quo. A more robust idea of government will not emerge from the current political parties. Both are beholden to big money. Substantive change will have to come from us. Or, as the great civil rights leader Ella Baker said, "we are the leaders we've been looking for"-a model of leadership that scares the hell out of the Reverend Sharpton. We will have to challenge the status quo in the streets and at the ballot box. In short, it will take a full-blown democratic awakening to enact this revolution.

On February 7 14, I flew to Raleigh, North Carolina, to join with tens of thousands of other like-minded people to protest the draconian laws passed by the North Carolina state legislature. Since 2010, while many people-especially black people-were still reeling from the 2008 recession/depression, Republicans eliminated Medicaid coverage for half a million North Carolinians, passed a voter-ID law designed to disenfranchise primarily African American voters, transferred $90 million from public schools to voucher schools and cut pre-K for 30,000 children, passed a law requiring women about to have an abortion to listen to the heartbeat of the fetus, repealed the earned income tax credit for 900,000 people, and constitutionally banned gay marriage. North Carolina Republicans had declared war. They represented clear examples of those who hold a view of government that hardens hearts and reinforces racial habits.

I watched from afar as the Forward Together moral movement took shape in response. People from all across North Carolina organized and mobilized to take back the state from extremists. The state NAACP, with its charismatic leader, Reverend William Barber II, built a movement from the ground up to challenge what they took to be an all-out assault on the moral and social fabric of the state. The movement was not simply a reaction to Tea Party Republicans. "We started this when the Democrats were in power," Barber said. "We put out the word. The state had not complied with the Leandro decision [a 1994 public-education-equity lawsuit]. We still had not given public employees collective bargaining rights. We didn't have a racial justice act." But the actions of the North Carolina GOP intensified the group's efforts. More than 900 people who engaged in nonviolent civil disobedience to protest the Republican agenda were arrested during the 2013 legislative session.

Reverend Barber put out a call across the country for a massive march in February to launch the 2014 Forward Together campaign. Eighty thousand to 100,000 people answered. It was the largest mass demonstration in the South since the Selma march in 1965.

I arrived early. It was cold, and clouds blocked the sun as organizers began to set up. A few people worked on their signs. One sign read PROTECT ALL N.C. CITIZENS with different examples of vulnerable groups written underneath (the mentally ill, the unemployed, teachers, the elderly, students, prisoners, the uninsured, minorities). I was struck from the beginning by the cross-section of people there. Old and young, straight and gay, black, white, and Latino all began to gather.

I asked a few of them why they were marching. Leslie Boyd, a white woman from Asheville, North Carolina, told me about her son, Michael Danforth. He had suffered from a birth defect that made it next to impossible for him to get health insurance. He died in the hospital, and ever since, she has dedicated her life to health care activism. She started a small nonprofit called Western North Carolina Health Advocates, through which she met Reverend Barber. He asked her to join the movement.

The cold weather drove me into the nearby McDonald's, where several people sipped coffee while they waited for the march to begin. I struck up a conversation with Martin Marshall from Atlanta, Georgia, and Ron Gray from Rock Hill, South Carolina. Martin told me a story about his childhood experiences with racism, about the wall that divided his white community from the black community, and how racism was still alive today. "Voter restrictions and access to health care " were · the reasons he was marching. Ron was less talkative. He said, "I will give you the short form: injustice. I am here because it is the right place to be."

Sitting next to Martin and Ron was an older white couple, Bill and Betsy Crittendon from Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They were members of an interracial choir called the United Voices of Praise. They had been involved in interracial social issues for a number of years and found the "regressive policies that have come about in this state [to be] just awful, absolutely awful. They have completely reversed the course of this state." Mrs. Crittendon wasn't too optimistic that the march would change the minds of state legislators, but she and her husband understood the long-term significance of the march and the Forward Together movement. "People need to see and hear what this is all about .... Every step along the way is a building step [to clear] the way for justice issues."

These were people from different walks of life who understood the common ground of suffering in this country. For them, that understanding did not require anyone to leave the particulars of their suffering at the door. Anti-racism remained a part of their advocacy whether they struggled for universal health care or a living wage. They joined with others to urge a fundamental change in North Carolina and the country that could help break down racial habits. Reverend Barber thinks of their efforts in this way:

[It's] about showing people the intersectionality of their lives; the intersectionality of their moving together . ... We have a phrase: we is the most important word in the justice vocabulary. The issue is not what I can do, but what we can do when we stand together, fight together, pray together, and work together, and we feel movement together.

As I finished the conversations in McDonald's, I looked outside. Busload after busload of people had begun to arrive. Before the march began, speakers rallied the crowd. The topics were wide-ranging, from LGBT concerns, the state of public education, issues of immigration and the status of undocumented workers, to racist voter-ID laws. It was an in-the-flesh performance of a multiracial, multi-issue coalition. And whenever someone shouted, "Forward together," the crowd replied, "Not one step back."

Initially, to an outsider looking in, the moment resembled the traditional theater of contemporary American protest. A march serves as a moment of catharsis. People gather, tensions are released, folks go back to business as usual, and the men (and it is typically always men) who lead the march leverage the spotlight for personal gain. But a brief glance beneath the surface of this particular gathering revealed something much more expansive. The march was just the tip of an organizing iceberg. Reverend Barber declared, "The Moral March inaugurates a fresh year of grassroots empowerment, voter education, litigation, and nonviolent direct action."

In other words, this march wasn't a culmination but a catalyst: it dramatized an organizing effort (which preceded the gathering) that encompassed the courtroom, the ballot box, and the streets. For Barber, the work of democracy doesn't happen through marches or backroom deals but through concerted efforts "to change the context in which power operates." Of course, voting matters. But democracy is about the commitment to get one's hands dirty, and that work is often selfless and thankless.

At the heart of those efforts is a more robust conception of government-a belief that government has the capacity to transform lives through focused legislation-and an insistence that we shift the center of moral gravity in North Carolina and in the nation. Five demands guide this insistence: (1) secure pro-labor, anti-poverty policies that ensure economic sustainability; (2) provide well-funded, quality public education to all; (3) stand up for the health of every North Carolinian by promoting health care access and environmental justice across all the state's communities; (4) address the continuing inequalities in the criminal justice system and ensure equality under the law for every person, regardless of race, class, creed, documentation, or sexual preference; and (5) protect and expand voting rights for people of color, immigrants, the elderly, and students to safeguard fair democratic representation. Each demand carries with it an expectation of the role of government in safeguarding the public good and an affirmation of the dignity and standing of all Americans. If we were to embrace these demands as policy, we would be well on our way to a revolution of value.

As we marched from historic Shaw University, the place where the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee was founded in April 1960, to the state capitol, Americans from all walks of life expressed a radically egalitarian vision of this country. This vision did not require African Americans to leave their experiences at the door. Alongside demands for marriage equality, cries for support of public education, and calls for a more robust commitment to labor, marchers embraced the call for an anti-racist politics. As Reverend Barber said, "Some people wanted us to emphasize poverty instead of race. But you have to speak the truth. [Race] can be the Achilles' heel of the movement or lend itself to your moral positioning." We have to confront white supremacy, or what Barber calls "the corruption of the spirit and the conscience," as a fundamental contradiction of American democracy, or face the consequences of our silence.

As the march concluded, I stood amazed at the power of ordinary people. Thousands of people had come together, for a moment, to declare their commitment to a radical vision of democracy. This is what has been missing in contemporary American politics. Reverend Barber's inspiring remarks struck a chord that reached back to the nineteenth-century abolitionists, black and white, who decided to become traitors in the name of American democracy. They turned their backs on the slave regime. Barber called us to do the same with the political extremists of our times.

We need the kind of language that's not left or right or conservative or liberal, but moral, fusion language that says look: it's extreme and immoral to suppress the right to vote. It's extreme and immoral to deny Medicaid for millions of poor people. . .. It's extreme and immoral to raise taxes on the working poor by cutting earned income taxes and to raise taxes on the poor and middle class in order to cut taxes for the wealthy. It's extreme and immoral to use power to cut off poor people's water in Detroit. That's immoral! What we need to cut off is that kind of abusive power! It's extreme and immoral to re-segregate our schools and underfund our public schools. It's extreme and immoral for people who came from immigrants to now have a mean amnesia and cry out against immigrants and the rights of children . ... That's not just bad policy, it's against the common good and a disregard for human rights. It's a refusal to lean toward the angels of our better selves . ... In policy and politics in America, we face two choices. One is the low road to political destruction, and the other is the pathway to higher ground.

Barber finished speaking-preaching, really. The crowd joined hands to sing "We Shall Overcome." The voices were full of emotion and faith, not the sound of trepidation heard in the voices of those who sang the song after Reagan's speech in the Rose Garden. For much of the march, the day had been cloudy and cold. But as he spoke, the sun finally broke through. "The sun has come out," Reverend Barber started to shout. "The sun has come out. We are on our way to higher ground. Even the universe blesses this day. Even the universe says yes to justice, yes to equality, yes to higher ground." Marchers shouted. In front of me stood a white Episcopalian preacher in tears. I wiped my own eyes.

This is the kind of social movement that will transform our idea of government. It insists on the dignity and standing of black people and other marginalized groups, and it argues for a dramatic change in what we as Americans care" most about. To be sure, the Forward Together moral movement isn't the only form of struggle we need. (In some ways, Reverend Barber represents the long-standing tradition of the charismatic preacher as leader, although he happens to be aware of the pitfalls of the model of leadership even as he exemplifies it.) It represents just one example of what a democratic awakening must do if we are to change the terms of political debate in this country: it must enact a different way of thinking about government and its relation to the most vulnerable among us.

## Cap

#### Neoliberalism structures identity even if they are opposed to it --- that crushes value to life and amplifies battle fatigue.

Srnicek & Williams 15 **–** Nick Srnicek is a Lecturer at City University London and a PhD from the London School of Economics; Alex Williams is a Lecturer at City University London [*Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*, Verso Books, p. 137-142]

As we have seen, neoliberalism propagated its ideology through a division of labour – academics shaping education, think tanks influencing policy, and popularisers manipulating the media. The inculcation of neoliberalism involved a full-spectrum project of constructing a hegemonic worldview. A new common sense was built that came to co-opt and eventually dominate the terminology of ‘modernity’ and ‘freedom’ – terminology that fifty years ago would have had very different connotations. Today, it is nearly impossible to speak these words without immediately invoking the precepts of neoliberal capitalism.

We all know today that ‘modernisation’ translates into job cuts, the slashing of welfare and the privatisation of government services. To modernise, today, simply means to neoliberalise. The term ‘freedom’ has suffered a similar fate, reduced to individual freedom, freedom from the state, and the freedom to choose between consumer goods. Liberal ideas of individual freedom played an important role in the ideological struggle with the USSR, priming the population of the Western world to mobilise behind any ideology that purported to value individual freedoms. With its emphasis on individual freedoms, neoliberalism was able to co-opt elements of movements organised around ‘libertarianism, identity politics, [and] multiculturalism’.55 Likewise, by emphasising freedom from the state, neoliberalism was able to appeal to anarcho-capitalists and the movements of desire that exploded in May 1968.56 Lsastly, with the idea of freedom being limited to a freedom of the market, the ideology could co-opt consumerist desires. At the level of production, neoliberal freedom could also recruit emerging desires among workers for flexible labour – desires that were soon turned against them.57 In struggling for and successfully seizing the ideological terrain of modernity and freedom, neoliberalism has managed to wind its way inexorably into our very self-conceptions. In arrogating the meaning of terms such as modernisation and freedom, neoliberalism has proved itself to be the single most successful hegemonic project of the last fifty years.

Neoliberalism has thus become ‘the form of our existence – the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, to relate to others and to ourselves’.58 It is, in other words, not just politicians, business leaders, the media elite and academics who have been enrolled into this vision of the world, but also workers, students, migrants – and everyone else. In other words, neoliberalism creates subjects. Paradigmatically, we are constructed as competitive subjects – a role that encompasses and surpasses industrial capitalism’s productive subject. The imperatives of neoliberalism drive these subjects to constant self-improvement in every aspect of their lives. Perpetual education, the omnipresent requirement to be employable, and the constant need for self-reinvention are all of a piece with this neoliberal subjectivity.59 The competitive subject, moreover, straddles the divide between the public and the private. One’s personal life is as bound to competition as one’s work life. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that anxiety proliferates in contemporary societies. Indeed, an entire battery of psychopathologies has been exacerbated under neoliberalism: stress, anxiety, depression and attention deficit disorders are increasingly common psychological responses to the world around us.60 Crucially, the construction of everyday neoliberalism has also been a primary source of political passivity. Even if you do not buy into the ideology, its effects nevertheless force you into increasingly precarious situations and increasingly entrepreneurial inclinations. We need money to survive, so we market ourselves, do multiple jobs, stress and worry about how to pay rent, pinch pennies at the at the grocery store, and turn socialising into networking. Given these effects, political mobilisation becomes a dream that is perpetually postponed, driven away by the anxieties and pressures of everyday life.

At the same time, we should recognise that this production of subjectivity was not simply an external imposition. Hegemony, in all its forms, operates not as an illusion, but as something that builds on the very real desires of the population. Neoliberal hegemony has played upon ideas, yearnings and drives already existing within society, mobilising and promising to fulfill those that could be aligned with its basic agenda. The worship of individual freedom, the value ascribed to hard work, freedom from the rigid work week, individual expression through work, the belief in meritocracy, the bitterness felt at corrupt politicians, unions and bureaucracies – these beliefs and desires pre-exist neoliberalism and find expression in it.61 Bridging the left–right divide, many people today are simply angry at what they see as others taking advantage of the system. Hatred for the rich tax evader combines easily with disgust for the poor welfare cheat; anger at the oppressive employer becomes indistinguishable from anger at all politicians. This is linked with the spread of middle-class identities and aspirations – desires for home ownership, self-reliance and entrepreneurial spirit were fostered and extended into formerly working-class social spaces.62 Neoliberal ideology has a grounding in lived experience and does not exist simply as an academic puzzle.63 Neoliberalism has become parasitical on everyday experience, and any critical analysis that misses this is bound to misrecognise the deep roots of neoliberalism in today’s society. Over the course of decades, neoliberalism has therefore come to shape not only elite opinions and beliefs, but also the normative fabric of everyday life itself. The particular interests of neoliberals have become universalised, which is to say, hegemonic.64 Neoliberalism constitutes our collective common sense, making us its subjects whether we believe in it or not.65

#### Horizontalism Link---ensuring community survival and care thru local linkages locks in a bourgeois ideology that serves as a salve for the crisis of capital---kills momentum for vertical organizing to seize the state

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But while these experiments with horizontalism brought about a number of achievements, its experience also revealed several further problems. Principal among these is the limitations faced by neighbourhood assemblies as an organisational form. Modelled on horizontalist principles, the neighbourhood assemblies arose in response to the immediate needs and possibilities opened up by the crisis. Like the general assembly of Occupy, they enabled people to have a newfound voice. But even when joined together in inter-neighbourhood assemblies, they never approached the point of replacing the state, or of being able to present themselves as a viable alternative. The functions of the state---welfare, healthcare, redistribution, education, and so on---were not about to be replaced by the horizontalist movement, even at its height of participation. It thus remained a localised response to the crisis. Further limitations surfaced as these assemblies could only function by either rejecting organised---which is to say, collective---interests, or incorporating them, and thus being overwhelmed.63 Collective interests were incapable of being brought into the decision-making process without breaking it, since they often took control over discussion and debate. Problematically, these assemblies operated best on an individualistic basis.

Other organisational experiments in Argentina involved the spread of worker-controlled factories. In the wake of the economic crisis, some shuttered businesses were taken over and maintained by their employees. These factories helped to keep workers in jobs, and there is some evidence that they provided better pay for their workers. Unfortunately, despite the attention given to them, the total number of people involved was relatively small: in the most optimistic estimates, there were around 250 factories incorporating just under 10,000 workers.64 With a labour force of over 18 million, this means far less than 0.1 per cent of the economy was participating in worker-controlled factories. Not only were these factories a minor part of the overall economy, but they also remained necessarily embedded within capitalist social relations. The dream of escape is just that: a dream. Tied to the imperative to create a profit, worker-controlled businesses can be just as oppressive and environmentally damaging as any large-scale business, but without the efficiencies of scale. Such problems are widespread across the worker-cooperative experience, having arisen not only in Argentina, but also in the Zapatista model and across America.

Beyond these organisational limits, the key problem with Argentina as a model for postcapitalism is that it was simply a salve for the problems of capitalism, not an alternative to it. As the economy started to improve, participation in the neighbourhood assemblies and alternative economies drastically declined.66 The post-crisis horizontalist movements in Argentina were built as an emergency response to the collapse of the existing order, not as a competitor to a relatively well-functioning order. Indeed, the more widespread problem with contemporary horizontalism is that it often sees emergency situations---in the wake of a hurricane, earthquake or economic meltdown---as representative of a better world.67 It is a struggle, to say the least, to see how post-disaster conditions are an improvement for the vast majority of the world’s population. A politics that finds its best expression in the breakdown of social and economic order is not an alternative, so much as a knee-jerk survival instinct. Equally problematic is the tendency for horizontalists to find political potential in the mundane ways we organise horizontally in everyday life---friends gathering together, parties, festivals, and so on.68 The problem is that such modes of organising are not scalable beyond a small community---and, more to the point, are not useful for certain political goals. As the Argentinean example shows, these modes of organising can be valuable for basic neighbourhood survival and for creating a sense of solidarity between people. But horizontalism struggles to compete against more organised interests, to sustain itself once a base level of normality returns, and to achieve long-term and large-scale political goals such as providing universal healthcare, high-level education and social security. These approaches remain useful in exceptional circumstances and for a small range of goals, but they will neither revolutionise society nor genuinely threaten global capitalism.

In the case of both neighbourhood assemblies and worker-controlled factories, we see that the primary organisational models of horizontalism are insufficient. They are often reactive tactics that fail to compete in the antagonistic environment of global capitalism. On a theoretical level, and in the actual experiences of Occupy and Argentina, the limits of horizontalism have repeatedly been made clear over the past decade. While recognising the important capacity of horizontalist tactics to provide small-scale support to communities and to temporarily disrupt certain exploitative practices, the commitment to fetishised versions of consensus, direct action, and particularly prefigurative politics, constrains the possibilities of expanding and overtaking existing social systems.

#### World systems theory emphasizes complex intersections but says the unit of analysis should be global not local or domestic---their K applies to older versions of Orthodox Marxism the alt isn’t defending

Engel-Di Mauro 9---Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

The above-described developments in world-systems theories have largely gone unnoticed within political ecology, perhaps due partially to Blaikie’s early abandonment. Probably more effective has been the treatment (and caricaturing) of world-systems perspectives as a single theory. As shown above, world-systems ‘‘theory” involves multiple theoretical perspectives and it is really a paradigm, perhaps less internally variegated than political ecology. The few political ecologists that have considered world- systems approaches typically charge a fictitiously unified world- systems ‘‘theory” with functionalism/tautology or economic/ structural determinism (Cole, 1999, p. 197; Forsyth, 2003, pp. 117–120). Forsyth, engaging in synechdoche, first collapses all world-systems theories into Wallerstein’s original ideas and re- duces world-systems approaches to all other (neo)Marxist perspectives. Then he claims that all such approaches unhelpfully reduce environmental problems to the destructive nature of capi- talism. Besides evincing internal reasoning problems, such critiques reflect earlier debates in sociology and anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s that have been incorporated and surpassed with the refinement and multiplication of world-systems perspectives9 or that had entirely misidentified the problems and characteristics of world-systems analysis (Peet, 1991, pp. 49–53). The critique of functionalism really confuses analytical categories used in world-systems theories for explanatory statements. Core, semiperiphery, and periphery and accumulation processes are analytical categories used not to explain, but to describe the specifically capitalist world-system. The content of these analytical categories has recently been challenged for their social reduction- ism, but they have not been abandoned. They remain useful if understood through context-specific spatio-material mechanisms (Bunker, 2003, pp. 238–239). As stated above, world-systems theories attempt to explain the evolving characteristics of and rise and fall of different world-systems, requiring careful and detailed historical analysis at many scales, including micro-social. This theory is also contested in that some maintain that such a global world- system emerged much earlier and/or is not as Europe-centred as once thought (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1998; Frank and Gills, 1993). However, in all these perspectives, the starting unit of analysis remains at the world-system scale (a historically variable unit in terms of Earth surface area and time period covered). The imputation of determinism is similarly misplaced. Wallerstein (1974), for instance, made it very clear from the begin- ning that world- and mini-systems develop and change as a result of shifts within and between their components. The characteristics described and explained in world-systems research involve the understanding of co-determination of all forms of social relations, including cultural, political, and economic aspects of ethnic, class, and gender relations (Hall, 2000). World- and mini-systems are also open systems, tending to be thereby dynamic, complex, and unpredictable (Straussfogel, 1997, 2000). The world-systems paradigm emphasis on the complex and mutual constitution of components and systems stands in contrast to the above-described mischaracterisations within political ecology.

#### The localism aerguments--- Conflating the local or domestic with global is analytic myopia that hinders anti-neoliberal praxis against both eco-degradation and social inequality

Engel-Di Mauro 9---Associate Professor of Geography at SUNY New Paltz (Salvatore, “Seeing the local in the global: Political ecologies, world-systems, and the question of scale”, Geoforum (2009):116-125)

These latest turns have yet to lead to an alternative comparative framework that would overcome the limitation created by a micro-scale oriented analysis. Walker’s proposal to employ an amended concept of region that entails analysing larger-scale structuring factors would helpfully direct political ecology towards such a framework (Walker, 2003, p. 8, 12–13), provided the region not become the analytical starting point. Such a neo-regionalist approach can avoid the above-discussed pitfalls by considering the interconnectedness intrinsic to the current world-system that shapes (dis- cursively contested) environmental processes and region-specific people–environment relations. For instance, Walker identifies substantive shifts in the local environmental politics in the rural areas of the western US as intimately associated with changing regional capitalist relations (2003, pp. 16–21). However, to cite one example, such regional processes have been predicated on, among other factors, world capitalist shifts, including the ability of US oil firms to secure vast quantities of fossil–fuel energy through US imperial might. Were the US national state not to have attained global economic and military supremacy, especially since the 1950s, the ex-urban, petrol- guzzling commuter behind the rural-residential economy and local landscape preservation simply could not exist. Such historical developments, furthermore, are predicated on the creation and enforcement of exploitation zones (of lesser paid and unpaid workers and resources like oil, heavy metals, etc.) within and outside the US that reach the household level. In other words, systemic and relational changes at the world capitalist scale shape regional people–environment relations and should be closely analysed to shed light on how regions (as combinations of social and environmental characteristics) even come into being. Another example that would benefit from a world-systems perspective could be in explaining regional differences in biocide production and use, which has recently been studied at the world scale (Robbins, 2007). Increasing biocide use in one place cannot be fully explained without considering what occurs in another, often far-away place. To add to Robbins’ large-scale analysis of agro-chemical industries and their repercussions, there could be a systemic and relational view of what is produced and used where. For example, uneven wages and capital flows between places, in accordance with pre-existing relations among different regions or countries, create conditions for some places to become rife with biocide use and/or characterised by agrochemical industry operations through the economic destabilisation (resource extraction, ‘‘underdevelopment”) of other places, with often negative, if differentiated environmental effects in all places concerned. Something similar can be said of the recent expansion of natural preserves (see Zimmerer, 2006) with the simultaneous worldwide reduction in biodiversity (increasing habitat destruction). Such a contradictory movement remains poorly explained without analysing world capitalist financial networks, centred in wealthy countries, which enable the expansion of urban/industrial and re- source-extraction areas worldwide and the changing roles of national states in the evolving capitalist world-system (e.g., legitimation functions, changes in capital-accumulation strategies and incentives). Another weakness in political ecology, due to omitting systemic and relational processes at the world scale, is evident in the understanding of discursive processes in policy-making circles, such as the treatment of ‘‘ecological modernisation” theory. Blaikie (1999, p. 138) offers, along with other political ecologists, a very carefully considered critique that avoids any implications of romanticised ‘‘pre-modern” human impacts. He points out the lack of analysis of social power relations and the curious absence of poorer countries or their particular contexts in ‘‘ecological modernisation” discussions (interestingly, Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003, p. 5, overlook the power relations aspect of the critique). But these critiques fail to consider the relational aspects that enable ‘‘ecological modernisation” even to exist as a discourse and as a set of regionally viable policies (i.e., the world-scale social relations and material conditions). When viewed through a world-systems lens, it becomes clear that such ‘‘modernisation” is often predicated on the maintenance of unequal exchange, through which less powerful national states expand internal territorial domination at the expense of local inhabitants and the most powerful national states establish greater direct or indirect control over conservation areas through loan contingencies (e.g., debts for nature swaps) and technocratic dictates on management priorities through NGOs and international political and economic institutions (e.g., the World Bank, the UN, Sierra Club, WWF), and the expansion of resource exploitation in poorer countries to allow for improvements in environmental quality in the wealthier countries (see Goldman, 1998). The above illustrations show how adopting world-systems theories and methodologies can enhance the practice and explanatory reach of political ecology perspectives. World-systems research concentrates on investigating large spatio-temporal scales to define the contextual units of analysis (e.g., long-term economic and hegemonic cycles) and mesh them with smaller scale phenomena (for works specifically related to environmental issues, see, for example, Barham et al., 1995; Bunker, 1985; Chew, 1999; Goldfrank et al., 1999). As exemplified in Dale Tomich’s work on plantation slavery systems in Martinique, micro-scale processes are not necessarily elided through large-scale (world-system) focus; on the contrary, as long as the emphasis is on the systemic and relational, they can be better understood and explained and contribute to understanding the making of larger-scale processes. ... although the object of inquiry ... is slave production in Martinique during the period 1830–1848, the unit of analysis is not Martinique itself. Rather, attention is paid to processes of commodity production and exchange beyond these boundaries ... to reconstruct the temporal and spatial frameworks that are constitutive of relations of slave production and exchange in Martinique in the historical process of development of the world economy. Thus, the world market and the French colonial system are not treated as ‘‘external” context or background for processes and relations in Martinique, but are taken to be formative of them. Conversely, Martinique represents a particular concatenation of diverse world processes. Each such process is revealed in the others, but none is reducible to any other. (Tomich, 1990, p. 7) By seeing the ‘‘local” in the ‘‘global”---to invert a tendency exemplified in Gezon (2005)---world-systems perspectives could productively divert political ecology research away from its highly problematic propensity to favour micro-scale (or meso-scale) empowerment as the solution to anthropogenic environmental degradation (Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 608).

#### Cap turns care---market logics transform persons to things and legitimize dual logics of commodification and gratuitous punishment

Mallipeddi 16---Assistant Professor of English at Hunter College [Ramesh, *Spectacular Suffering*, University of Virginia Press, pp. 3-4]

I begin with a juxtaposition of Dickson and Equiano because they encapsulate this book's two central lines of inquiry. Spectacular Suffering focuses on moments of witnessing slavery in the long eighteenth century and the structures of sentimental affect that invariably attend these moments. First, my analysis approaches the problem of slavery as a problem of embodiment, evidenced both in Dickson's visceral response to the scarred, fettered slave and in Equiano's rage against the potential flogging he may receive. This foregrounding of bodily experience is a central element in sentimental representations of slave distress, since the two features of Atlantic slavery-commodification and punishment-are fundamentally concerned with the transformations of the body, with the subjection of the raced body to the regimes of the market and to plantation discipline. From its inception, the Atlantic slave trade and mercantile capital transformed persons into things, human beings into commodities, singular selves into exchangeable units. Plantation slavery, in turn, intensified the commodifying operations of the slave trade by turning captive Africans into fungible possessions, depriving the enslaved of any rights to their bodies. As the episodes from Sloane and Dickson reveal, West Indian slave laws categorized Africans as their master's property, granting the latter virtually unlimited punitive power. The movement of sympathetic feeling is frequently a direct corollary of the objectifying operations of mercantile capital, on one hand, and the exercise of slaveholder disciplinary authority, on the other. It is by counterposing the singular body to the abstract commodity, the particular to the typical, and taking affective property in the slaves in opposition to the claims of legal proprietorship assumed by the slaveholders that metropolitan observers such as Dickson registered their disquiet over enslavement.

#### Fighting class oppression necessitates anti-racist action. Only our solidarity-based politics solves.

Saqib BHATTI 16, a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute and Director of the ReFund America Project [“The Only Way to Defeat Trump Is to Understand That Race and Class Are Inseparable,” *In These Times*, December 22, 2016, http://inthesetimes.com/features/trump\_left\_resistance\_solidarity.html]

IN POSTELECTION STRATEGY MEETINGS, progressives everywhere are asking: Should we organize around race or class? Inevitably, someone answers, “Of course, we need to do both.” Heads nod.

I disagree. The answer is not “both,” which presumes they are separable. Because racial division is a critical tool of class oppression, we cannot address one without the other.

Most economic justice organizers on the Left, myself included, organize people of color around both race and class, but not white folks around race. In fact, we actively avoid it – with a few notable exceptions, like the faith-based group ISAIAH, which has successfully organized predominantly white churches in the Minnesota suburbs against racism.

When we talk about how the system is set up to help rich people and hurt poor people, we mostly confine our racial analysis to the subpoint that communities of color are hurt more. But the reality goes beyond that: We must talk more about how wealthy, powerful people of all races (and the corporations they control) incite racism to win support for regressive economic policies. For example, the Right paints single Black mothers as “welfare queens” to gain white support for gutting programs like food stamps, even though the overwhelming majority of food stamp recipients are white.

Poor white people are also harmed by corporate practices that are rooted in structural racism, like the sale of subprime mortgages. Banks and mortgage lenders aggressively targeted Black and Latino families with predatory subprime loans that were overpriced and highly risky. According to affidavits by workers at Wells Fargo, subprime mortgages were referred to within the bank as “ghetto loans” and their recipients called “mud people.”

But even though banks targeted Black and Latino families for subprime mortgages, and these families were more likely than their white counterparts to receive them, the overwhelming majority of families who received subprime mortgages were white – and millions lost their homes.

Poor white families do benefit from their whiteness in countless ways, but those benefits haven’t been enough to lift them out of poverty. They’ve been outweighed by the harm done by a slew of policies and practices, from Medicaid cuts and the dismantling of public housing, that were sold through racism. Whether explicitly or via dog whistles, the Right invokes race to divert blame from the ruling class for eroding white working-class people’s livelihoods and prospects. Donald Trump just won an election by scapegoating Black people, Latinos and Muslims, among others, as the culprits that made America not “great.”

In response, the Left must go on offense and name the real villains: those who are using race to enrich themselves at the expense of poor people of all races. One such villain will soon be in charge of our nation’s economy. Steve Mnuchin, Trump’s nominee to lead the Treasury Department, ran a foreclosure machine that kicked thousands of families to the curb, earning him the moniker “foreclosure king.” Families all across the country personally know people who lost their homes as a result.

Because economic and political power is so heavily concentrated, finding common enemies should not be hard. In September 2016, MHAction, which organizes in manufactured, or mobile, home communities, brought its predominantly white members from eight states to Manhattan to join New York Communities for Change’s predominantly Black and Latino members to disrupt a high-powered real-estate conference. The conference featured private equity tycoons like Sam Zell who are buying up manufactured home communities in suburban, exurban and rural areas, as well as affordable rental units in cities, and evicting their residents.

Such actions lay the foundation for a multiracial movement of working-class families who understand that none of us will ever be free until we dismantle white supremacy.

#### Capitalism created slavery that produced anti-blackness, not the reverse.

Selfa 10 – Editor of and contributor to International Socialist Review; quoting Eric Williams, D. Phil from Oxford, first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago; and quoting Howard University Professor of Classics Frank Snowden [Lance, “The roots of racism,” http://socialistworker.org/2010/10/21/the-roots-of-racism, accessed 20 Jun 2016]

Fortunately, racism isn't part of human nature. The best evidence for this assertion is the fact that racism has not always existed. Racism is a particular form of oppression. It stems from discrimination against a group of people based on the idea that some inherited characteristic, such as skin color, makes them inferior to their oppressors. Yet the concepts of "race" and "racism" are modern inventions. They arose and became part of the dominant ideology of society in the context of the African slave trade at the dawn of capitalism in the 1500s and 1600s. Although it is a commonplace for academics and opponents of socialism to claim that Karl Marx ignored racism, Marx in fact described the processes that created modern racism. His explanation of the rise of capitalism placed the African slave trade, the European extermination of indigenous people in the Americas and colonialism at its heart. In Capital, Marx writes: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of the continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins are all things that characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. Marx connected his explanation of the role of the slave trade in the rise of capitalism to the social relations that produced racism against Africans. In Wage Labor and Capital, written 12 years before the American Civil War, he explains: What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It only becomes capital in certain relations. Torn away from these conditions, it is as little capital as gold by itself is money, or as sugar is the price of sugar. In this passage, Marx shows no prejudice to Blacks ("a man of the black race," "a Negro is a Negro"), but he mocks society's equation of "Black" and "slave" ("one explanation is as good as another"). He shows how the economic and social relations of emerging capitalism thrust Blacks into slavery ("he only becomes a slave in certain relations"), which produce the dominant ideology that equates being African with being a slave. These fragments of Marx's writing give us a good start in understanding the Marxist explanation of the origins of racism. As the Trinidadian historian of slavery Eric Williams put it: "Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery." And, one should add, the consequence of modern slavery at the dawn of capitalism. While slavery existed as an economic system for thousands of years before the conquest of America, racism as we understand it today did not exist. From time immemorial? The classical empires of Greece and Rome were based on slave labor. But ancient slavery was not viewed in racial terms. Slaves were most often captives in wars or conquered peoples. If we understand white people as originating in what is today Europe, then most slaves in ancient Greece and Rome were white. Roman law made slaves the property of their owners, while maintaining a "formal lack of interest in the slave's ethnic or racial provenance," wrote Robin Blackburn in The Making of New World Slavery. Over the years, slave manumission produced a mixed population of slave and free in Roman-ruled areas, in which all came to be seen as "Romans." The Greeks drew a sharper line between Greeks and "barbarians," those subject to slavery. Again, this was not viewed in racial or ethnic terms, as the socialist historian of the Haitian Revolution, C.L.R. James, explained: [H]istorically, it is pretty well proved now that the ancient Greeks and Romans knew nothing about race. They had another standard--civilized and barbarian--and you could have white skin and be a barbarian, and you could be black and civilized. More importantly, encounters in the ancient world between the Mediterranean world and Black Africans did not produce an upsurge of racism against Africans. In Before Color Prejudice, Howard University classics professor Frank Snowden documented innumerable accounts of interaction between the Greco-Roman and Egyptian civilizations and the Kush, Nubian, and Ethiopian kingdoms of Africa. He found substantial evidence of integration of Black Africans in the occupational hierarchies of the ancient Mediterranean empires and Black-white intermarriage. Black and mixed race gods appeared in Mediterranean art, and at least one Roman emperor, Septimius Severus, was an African. Between the 10th and 16th centuries, the chief source of slaves in Western Europe was Eastern Europe. In fact, the word "slave" comes from the word "Slav," the people of Eastern Europe. This outline doesn't mean to suggest a "pre-capitalist" Golden Age of racial tolerance, least of all in the slave societies of antiquity. Empires viewed themselves as centers of the universe and looked on foreigners as inferiors. Ancient Greece and Rome fought wars of conquest against peoples they presumed to be less advanced. Religious scholars interpreted the Hebrew Bible's "curse of Ham" from the story of Noah to condemn Africans to slavery. Cultural and religious associations of the color white with light and angels and the color black with darkness and evil persisted. But none of these cultural or ideological factors explain the rise of New World slavery or the "modern" notions of racism that developed from it. The African slave trade The slave trade lasted for a little more than 400 years, from the mid-1400s, when the Portuguese made their first voyages down the African coast, to the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888. Slave traders took as many as 12 million Africans by force to work on the plantations in South America, the Caribbean and North America. About 13 percent of slaves (1.5 million) died during the Middle Passage--the trip by boat from Africa to the New World. The African slave trade--involving African slave merchants, European slavers and New World planters in the traffic in human cargo--represented the greatest forced population transfer ever. The charge that Africans "sold their own people" into slavery has become a standard canard against "politically correct" history that condemns the European role in the African slave trade. The first encounters of the Spanish and Portuguese, and later the English, with African kingdoms revolved around trade in goods. Only after the Europeans established New World plantations requiring huge labor gangs did the slave trade begin. African kings and chiefs did indeed sell into slavery captives in wars or members of other communities. Sometimes, they concluded alliances with Europeans to support them in wars, with captives from their enemies being handed over to the Europeans as booty. The demands of the plantation economies pushed "demand" for slaves. Supply did not create its own demand. In any event, it remains unseemly to attempt to absolve the European slavers by reference to their African partners in crime. As historian Basil Davidson rightly argues about African chiefs' complicity in the slave trade: "In this, they were no less 'moral' than the Europeans who had instigated the trade and bought the captives." Onboard, Africans were restricted in their movements so that they wouldn't combine to mutiny on the ship. In many slave ships, slaves were chained down, stacked like firewood with less than a foot between them. On the plantations, slaves were subjected to a regimen of 18-hour workdays. All members of slave families were set to work. Since the New World tobacco and sugar plantations operated nearly like factories, men, women and children were assigned tasks, from the fields to the processing mills. Slaves were denied any rights. Throughout the colonies in the Caribbean to North America, laws were passed establishing a variety of common practices: Slaves were forbidden to carry weapons, they could marry only with the owner's permission, and their families could be broken up. They were forbidden to own property. Masters allowed slaves to cultivate vegetables and chickens, so the master wouldn't have to attend to their food needs. But they were forbidden even to sell for profit the products of their own gardens. Some colonies encouraged religious instruction among slaves, but all of them made clear that a slave's conversion to Christianity didn't change their status as slaves. Other colonies discouraged religious instruction, especially when it became clear to the planters that church meetings were one of the chief ways that slaves planned conspiracies and revolts. It goes without saying that slaves had no political or civil rights, with no right to an education, to serve on juries, to vote or to run for public office. The planters instituted barbaric regimes of repression to prevent any slave revolts. Slave catchers using tracker dogs would hunt down any slaves who tried to escape the plantation. The penalties for any form of slave resistance were extreme and deadly. One description of the penalties slaves faced in Barbados reports that rebellious slaves would be punished by "nailing them down on the ground with crooked sticks on every Limb, and then applying the Fire by degrees from Feet and Hands, burning them gradually up to the Head, whereby their pains are extravagant." Barbados planters could claim a reimbursement from the government of 25 pounds per slave executed. The African slave trade helped to shape a wide variety of societies from modern Argentina to Canada. These differed in their use of slaves, the harshness of the regime imposed on slaves, and the degree of mixing of the races that custom and law permitted. But none of these became as virulently racist--insisting on racial separation and a strict color bar--as the English North American colonies that became the United States. Unfree labor in the North American colonies Notwithstanding the horrible conditions that African slaves endured, it is important to underscore that when European powers began carving up the New World between them, African slaves were not part of their calculations. When we think of slavery today, we think of it primarily from the point of view of its relationship to racism. But planters in the 17th and 18th centuries looked at it primarily as a means to produce profits. Slavery was a method of organizing labor to produce sugar, tobacco and cotton. It was not, first and foremost, a system for producing white supremacy. How did slavery in the U.S. (and the rest of the New World) become the breeding ground for racism? For much of the first century of colonization in what became the United States, the majority of slaves and other "unfree laborers" were white. The term "unfree" draws the distinction between slavery and servitude and "free wage labor" that is the norm in capitalism. One of the historic gains of capitalism for workers is that workers are "free" to sell their ability to labor to whatever employer will give them the best deal. Of course, this kind of freedom is limited at best. Unless they are independently wealthy, workers aren't free to decide not to work. They're free to work or starve. Once they do work, they can quit one employer and go to work for another. But the hallmark of systems like slavery and indentured servitude was that slaves or servants were "bound over" to a particular employer for a period of time, or for life in the case of slaves. The decision to work for another master wasn't the slave's or the servant's. It was the master's, who could sell slaves for money or other commodities like livestock, lumber or machinery. The North American colonies started predominantly as private business enterprises in the early 1600s. Unlike the Spanish, whose conquests of Mexico and Peru in the 1500s produced fabulous gold and silver riches for Spain, settlers in places like the colonies that became Maryland, Rhode Island, and Virginia made money through agriculture. In addition to sheer survival, the settlers' chief aim was to obtain a labor force that could produce the large amounts of indigo, tobacco, sugar and other crops that would be sold back to England. From 1607, when Jamestown was founded in Virginia to about 1685, the primary source of agricultural labor in English North America came from white indentured servants. The colonists first attempted to press the indigenous population into labor. But the Indians refused to be become servants to the English. Indians resisted being forced to work, and they escaped into the surrounding area, which, after all, they knew far better than the English. One after another, the English colonies turned to a policy of driving out the Indians. The colonists then turned to white servants. Indentured servants were predominantly young white men--usually English or Irish--who were required to work for a planter master for some fixed term of four to seven years. The servants received room and board on the plantation but no pay. And they could not quit and work for another planter. They had to serve their term, after which they might be able to acquire some land and to start a farm for themselves. They became servants in several ways. Some were prisoners, convicted of petty crimes in Britain, or convicted of being troublemakers in Britain's first colony, Ireland. Many were kidnapped off the streets of Liverpool or Manchester, and put on ships to the New World. Some voluntarily became servants, hoping to start farms after they fulfilled their obligations to their masters. For most of the 1600s, the planters tried to get by with a predominantly white, but multiracial workforce. But as the 17th century wore on, colonial leaders became increasingly frustrated with white servant labor. For one thing, they faced the problem of constantly having to recruit labor as servants' terms expired. Second, after servants finished their contracts and decided to set up their farms, they could become competitors to their former masters. And finally, the planters didn't like the servants' "insolence." The mid-1600s were a time of revolution in England, when ideas of individual freedom were challenging the old hierarchies based on royalty. The colonial planters tended to be royalists, but their servants tended to assert their "rights as Englishmen" to better food, clothing and time off. Most laborers in the colonies supported the servants. As the century progressed, the costs of servant labor increased. Planters started to petition the colonial boards and assemblies to allow the large-scale importation of African slaves. Black slaves worked on plantations in small numbers throughout the 1600s. But until the end of the 1600s, it cost planters more to buy slaves than to buy white servants. Blacks lived in the colonies in a variety of statuses--some were free, some were slaves, some were servants. The law in Virginia didn't establish the condition of lifetime, perpetual slavery or even recognize African servants as a group different from white servants until 1661. Blacks could serve on juries, own property and exercise other rights. Northampton County, Virginia, recognized interracial marriages and, in one case, assigned a free Black couple to act as foster parents for an abandoned white child. There were even a few examples of Black freemen who owned white servants. Free Blacks in North Carolina had voting rights. In the 1600s, the Chesapeake society of eastern Virginia had a multiracial character, according to historian Betty Wood: There is persuasive evidence dating from the 1620s through the 1680s that there were those of European descent in the Chesapeake who were prepared to identify and cooperate with people of African descent. These affinities were forged in the world of plantation work.

On many plantations, Europeans and West Africans labored side by side in the tobacco fields, performing exactly the same types and amounts of work; they lived and ate together in shared housing; they socialized together; and sometimes they slept together. The planters' economic calculations played a part in the colonies' decision to move toward full-scale slave labor. By the end of the 17th century, the price of white indentured servants outstripped the price of African slaves. A planter could buy an African slave for life for the same price that he could purchase a white servant for 10 years. As Eric Williams explained: Here, then, is the origin of Negro slavery. The reason was economic, not racial; it had to do not with the color of the laborer, but the cheapness of the labor. [The planter] would have gone to the moon, if necessary, for labor. Africa was nearer than the moon, nearer too than the more populous countries of India and China. But their turn would soon come. Planters' fear of a multiracial uprising also pushed them towards racial slavery. Because a rigid racial division of labor didn't exist in the 17th century colonies, many conspiracies involving Black slaves and white indentured servants were hatched and foiled. We know about them today because of court proceedings that punished the runaways after their capture. As historians T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes point out, "These cases reveal only extreme actions, desperate attempts to escape, but for every group of runaways who came before the courts, there were doubtless many more poor whites and blacks who cooperated in smaller, less daring ways on the plantation." The largest of these conspiracies developed into Bacon's Rebellion, an uprising that threw terror into the hearts of the Virginia Tidewater planters in 1676. Several hundred farmers, servants and slaves initiated a protest to press the colonial government to seize Indian land for distribution. The conflict spilled over into demands for tax relief and resentment of the Jamestown establishment. Planter Nathaniel Bacon helped organize an army of whites and Blacks that sacked Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The rebel army held out for eight months before the Crown managed to defeat and disarm it. Bacon's Rebellion was a turning point. After it ended, the Tidewater planters moved in two directions: first, they offered concessions to the white freemen, lifting taxes and extending to them the vote; and second, they moved to full-scale racial slavery. Fifteen years earlier, the Burgesses had recognized the condition of slavery for life and placed Africans in a different category as white servants. But the law had little practical effect. "Until slavery became systematic, there was no need for a systematic slave code. And slavery could not become systematic so long as an African slave for life cost twice as much as an English servant for a five-year term," wrote historian Barbara Jeanne Fields. Both of those circumstances changed in the immediate aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion. In the entire 17th century, the planters imported about 20,000 African slaves. The majority of them were brought to North American colonies in the 24 years after Bacon's Rebellion. In 1664, the Maryland legislature passed a law determining who would be considered slaves on the basis of the condition of their father--whether their father was slave or free. It soon became clear, however, that establishing paternity was difficult, but that establishing who was a person's mother was definite. So the planters changed the law to establish slave status on the basis of the mother's condition. Now white slaveholders who fathered children by slave women would be guaranteed their offspring as slaves. And the law included penalties for "free" women who slept with slaves. But what's most interesting about this law is that it doesn't really speak in racial terms. It attempts to preserve the property rights of slaveholders and establish barriers between slave and free which were to become hardened into racial divisions over the next few years. Taking the Maryland law as an example, Fields made this important point: Historians can actually observe colonial Americans in the act of preparing the ground for race without foreknowledge of what would later arise on the foundation they were laying. [T]he purpose of the experiment is clear: to prevent the erosion of slaveowners' property rights that would result if the offspring of free white women impregnated by slave men were entitled to freedom. The language of the preamble to the law makes clear that the point was not yet race. Race does not explain the law. Rather, the law shows society in the act of inventing race. After establishing that African slaves would cultivate major cash crops of the North American colonies, the planters then moved to establish the institutions and ideas that would uphold white supremacy. Most unfree labor became Black labor. Laws and ideas intended to underscore the subhuman status of Black people--in a word, the ideology of racism and white supremacy--emerged full-blown over the next generation. "All men are created equal" Within a few decades, the ideology of white supremacy was fully developed. Some of the greatest minds of the day--such as Scottish philosopher David Hume and Thomas Jefferson, the man who wrote the Declaration of Independence--wrote treatises alleging Black inferiority. The ideology of white supremacy based on the natural inferiority of Blacks, even allegations that Blacks were subhuman, strengthened throughout the 18th century. This was the way that the leading intellectual figures of the time reconciled the ideals of the 1776 American Revolution with slavery. The American Revolution of 1776 and later the French Revolution of 1789 popularized the ideas of liberty and the rights of all human beings. The Declaration of Independence asserts that "all men are created equal" and possess certain "unalienable rights"--rights that can't be taken away--of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." As the first major bourgeois revolution, the American Revolution sought to establish the rights of the new capitalist class against the old feudal monarchy. It started with the resentment of the American merchant class that wanted to break free from British restrictions on its trade. But its challenge to British tyranny also gave expression to a whole range of ideas that expanded the concept of "liberty" from being just about trade to include ideas of human rights, democracy, and civil liberties. It legitimized an assault on slavery as an offense to liberty. Some of the leading American revolutionaries, such as Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin, endorsed abolition. Slaves and free Blacks also pointed to the ideals of the revolution to call for abolishing slavery. But because the revolution aimed to establish the rule of capital in America, and because a lot of capitalists and planters made a lot of money from slavery, the revolution compromised with slavery. The Declaration initially contained a condemnation of King George for allowing the slave trade, but Jefferson dropped it following protests from representatives from Georgia and the Carolinas. How could the founding fathers of the U.S.--most of whom owned slaves themselves--reconcile the ideals of liberty for which they were fighting with the existence of a system that represented the exact negation of liberty? The ideology of white supremacy fit the bill. We know today that "all men" didn't include women, Indians or most whites. But to rule Black slaves out of the blessings of liberty, the leading head-fixers of the time argued that Blacks weren't really "men," they were a lower order of being. Jefferson's Notes from Virginia, meant to be a scientific catalogue of the flora and fauna of Virginia, uses arguments that anticipate the "scientific racism" of the 1800s and 1900s. With few exceptions, no major institution--such as the universities, the churches or the newspapers of the time--raised criticisms of white supremacy or of slavery. In fact, they helped pioneer religious and academic justifications for slavery and Black inferiority. As C.L.R. James put it, "[T]he conception of dividing people by race begins with the slave trade. This thing was so shocking, so opposed to all the conceptions of society which religion and philosophers had, that the only justification by which humanity could face it was to divide people into races and decide that the Africans were an inferior race." White supremacy wasn't only used to justify slavery. It was also used to keep in line the two-thirds of Southern whites who weren't slaveholders. Unlike the French colony of St. Domingue or the British colony of Barbados, where Blacks vastly outnumbered whites, Blacks were a minority in the slave South. A tiny minority of slave-holding whites, who controlled the governments and economies of the Deep South states, ruled over a population that was roughly two-thirds white farmers and workers and one-third Black slaves. The slaveholders' ideology of racism and white supremacy helped to divide the working population, tying poor whites to the slaveholders. Slavery afforded poor white farmers what Fields called a "social space" whereby they preserved an illusory "independence" based on debt and subsistence farming, while the rich planters continued to dominate Southern politics and society. "A caste system as well as a form of labor," historian James M. McPherson wrote, "slavery elevated all whites to the ruling caste and thereby reduced the potential for class conflict." The great abolitionist Frederick Douglass understood this dynamic: The hostility between the whites and blacks of the South is easily explained. It has its root and sap in the relation of slavery, and was incited on both sides by the cunning of the slave masters. Those masters secured their ascendancy over both the poor whites and the Blacks by putting enmity between them. They divided both to conquer each. [Slaveholders denounced emancipation as] tending to put the white working man on an equality with Blacks, and by this means, they succeed in drawing off the minds of the poor whites from the real fact, that by the rich slave-master, they are already regarded as but a single remove from equality with the slave. Slavery and capitalism Slavery in the colonies helped produce a boom in the 18th century economy that provided the launching pad for the industrial revolution in Europe. From the start, colonial slavery and capitalism were linked. While it is not correct to say that slavery created capitalism, it is correct to say that slavery provided one of the chief sources for the initial accumulations of wealth that helped to propel capitalism forward in Europe and North America. The clearest example of the connection between plantation slavery and the rise of industrial capitalism was the connection between the cotton South, Britain and, to a lesser extent, the Northern industrial states. Here, we can see the direct link between slavery in the U.S. and the development of the most advanced capitalist production methods in the world. Cotton textiles accounted for 75 percent of British industrial employment in 1840, and, at its height, three-fourths of that cotton came from the slave plantations of the Deep South. And Northern ships and ports transported the cotton. To meet the boom in the 1840s and 1850s, the planters became even more vicious. On the one hand, they tried to expand slavery into the West and Central America. The fight over the extension of slavery into the territories eventually precipitated the Civil War in 1861. On the other hand, they drove slaves harder--selling more cotton to buy more slaves just to keep up. On the eve of the Civil War, the South was petitioning to lift the ban on the importation of slaves that had existed officially since 1808. Karl Marx clearly understood the connection between plantation slavery in the cotton South and the development of capitalism in England. He wrote in Capital: While the cotton industry introduced child-slavery into England, in the United States, it gave the impulse for the transformation of the more or less patriarchal slavery into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage-laborers in Europe needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal. Capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt. The close connection between slavery and capitalism, and thus, between racism and capitalism, gives the lie to those who insist that slavery would have just died out. In fact, the South was more dependent on slavery right before the Civil War than it was 50 or 100 years earlier. Slavery lasted as long as it did because it was profitable. And it was profitable to the richest and most "well-bred" people in the world. The Civil War abolished slavery and struck a great blow against racism. But racism itself wasn't abolished. On the contrary, just as racism was created to justify colonial slavery, racism as an ideology was refashioned. It now no longer justified the enslavement of Blacks, but it justified second-class status for Blacks as wage laborers and sharecroppers. Racist ideology was also refashioned to justify imperialist conquest at the turn of the last century. As a handful of competing world powers vied to carve up the globe into colonial preserves for cheap raw materials and labor, racism served as a convenient justification. The vast majority of the world's people were now portrayed as inferior races, incapable of determining their own future. Slavery disappeared, but racism remained as a means to justify the domination of millions of people by the U.S., various European powers, and later by Japan. Because racism is woven right into the fabric of capitalism, new forms of racism arose with changes in capitalism. As the U.S. economy expanded and underpinned U.S. imperial expansion, imperialist racism--which asserted that the U.S. had a right to dominate other peoples, such as Mexicans and Filipinos--developed. As the U.S. economy grew and sucked in millions of immigrant laborers, anti-immigrant racism developed. But these are both different forms of the same ideology--of white supremacy and division of the world into "superior" and "inferior" races--that had their origins in slavery. Racism and capitalism have been intertwined since the beginning of capitalism. You can't have capitalism without racism. Therefore, the final triumph over racism will only come when we abolish racism's chief source--capitalism--and build a new socialist society.